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HURRICANES AND HOUSING
highlighting the ongoing impact of Hurricane Michael and the post-disaster housing problem
Mary Beth Barr, Architecture Undergraduate | Fall 2021  
ABSTRACT
Hurricanes impact individuals and communities on many levels - 
emotional, physical, mental, financial - to name a few. Every time 
a hurricane occurs, lives are drastically altered forever. One of the 
ways that hurricanes impact individuals and communities most 
powerfully is through the effect that they have on housing. Unleashing 
uncontrollable damage to infrastructure and the built environment, 
hurricanes exacerbate housing problems that exist and create new 
ones where they did not exist before.  Hurricane Michael, which 
catastrophically impacted the Florida Panhandle in 2018, is a case 
study in which the impact that hurricanes have on housing is prevalent. 
By drawing connections from a series of questionnaires answered 
by local individuals and previously recorded interviews,  this 
exploration presents observations about the impact that Hurricane 
Michael had on communities in North Florida and how its impact 
is still being felt today. Many individuals feel that they have been 
forgotten by federal governments and the national media while 
their communities still try to recover and housing shortages remain 
a problem. Through a series of posters illustrating the human 
experience during and after Hurricane Michael, this exploration 
seeks to ensure that communities affected by Hurricane Michael 
are not forgotten. Research is also presented discussing the 
impact of Hurricane Michael on housing in North Florida, as 
well as suggestions of solutions to the problem and next steps.
A special thank you to select Bay County residents for telling their stories.
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We all know that there are moments in our lives that change the 
course of the rest of them and impact the lives of those that come after 
us. What we don’t know is when these moments are going to happen. 
On October 10, 2018, one of these moments came. A category five 
hurricane named Hurricane Michael made landfall in Panama City, 
Florida. I was born and raised in Panama City. That’s where my dad 
was born, where both of my parents grew up, went to school, and 
met each other. We used to get ice cream or donuts and drive around 
the old part of town while my dad told us stories about what he did in 
that building, who he met in that one, someone he knew that lived in 
another. He called it “cruising Main Street” even though there was no 
“Main Street.” All of these buildings, every single one, look different 
now thanks to Hurricane Michael. Some are not even there anymore. 
Hurricane Michael, or “the storm,” as we call it, directly impacted 
every childhood memory I have and my family forever. It has done 
the same for almost everyone that I know. I have thought about it 
and its impact almost every day since, because how could I not? It 
is the reason my parents were displaced and relocated to another 
state, out of the home they built and had lived in for almost thirty 
years. It is the reason I will probably never see some of my childhood 
friends again because I have no reason to go back to the city we 
grew up in anymore. My position regarding the hurricane has been 
in two places since that day. I have been in a position of thankfulness 
that my family and friends survived safely, but also a position of
INTRODUCTION
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helplessness because I am so far away, only in my twenties, and in 
college. What could someone like me do to help? Since then, I have 
only grown more interested in the impact that Hurricane Michael had 
on my hometown and communities around it. Hearing stories and 
reading articles about how the impacts of Hurricane Michael are 
still being felt tugs at my heartstrings. Many community members, 
even community leaders, feel that they have been forgotten by 
the federal government and national media. They are still reeling. 
Hurricanes and Housing is an exploration that seeks to tell the often 
untold or unheard stories of community members during and after 
Hurricane Michael. Seeing how my hometown, family, and friends 
were impacted, and remain impacted by the events of October 10, 
2018, leaves me with the inability to turn my head to the problems 
that are so present in post-disaster housing implementation across 
the country. Hurricane Michael does not stand alone as a storm 
that impacted infrastructure, communities, and people forever, with 
effects being felt years later. According to the Insurance Information 
Institute, “a typical year has twelve named storms, six hurricanes, 
and three major hurricanes” (2020). In recent years, the number 
of hurricanes has met or surpassed this average and is projected 
to continue rising in number due to climate change, especially in 
coastal areas (III 2020). The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale 
measures hurricanes based on their sustained wind speed and 
categorizes them on a scale from 1 to 5, predicting their level of 
potential property damage. Hurricanes that reach a category 3, 
4, or 5 are considered major hurricanes due to their potential for
considerable property damage and loss of life (NOAA 2020). In the 
United States, major hurricanes cause an average of $17,000 of 
estimated insured property loss each year (III 2020). In total there are 
over 7 million homes in the United States at risk for hurricane damage 
(III 2020). A hurricane’s impact on infrastructure is significant, and 
its impact on people is only going to continue to become more 
significant. This is because the populations of coastal counties 
most susceptible to hurricane damage have some of the most 
significant percent growths in population in the country (III 2020).
What happens to housing 
when a hurricane strikes?
Many hardships and problems arise in the days, weeks, months, 
and years following a hurricane. In one day, priorities shift suddenly 
to surviving and recovering. One of the most significant of these 
issues, one that is continuing and worsening, is housing. Most 
families are displaced from their homes immediately following a 
hurricane and the long journey to getting their own roof put back 
over their heads begins. The people who tend to suffer the most 
in these situations are home renters and those with low incomes, 
due to lack of insurance or because FEMA and other disaster relief 
organizations direct most of their efforts toward homeowners (NLIHC 
2019, 1). After Hurricane Michael, an estimated twenty thousand 
people were displaced, seventy percent of which were home renters 
(Thompson 2019). The inability to anticipate the amount of damage 
that will result from a given hurricane, and therefore an inability to 
anticipate how many people will be without a place to live, combined 
with well-meaning but insufficient disaster relief aids, results in long-
lasting housing crises. These arise in almost every city impacted by 
property-damaging hurricanes. A considerable amount of research 
has been done that discusses the problems with housing following 
such a storm. Given a substantial lack of housing in communities 
following these disasters, property taxes and rents on the housing 
that remains tend to double or triple (Thompson 2019). Many are 
also without work following disasters and are unable to pay high 
prices. This results, as in the case of Hurricane Michael, in hundreds 
of families still living in “tent communities” or things of the sort – 
homeless – for a year or more after a storm (Thompson 2019). An 
already devastating and increasing issue with homelessness in this 
country and world is worsened every time a natural disaster occurs.
Figure 1. Damage to housing caused by Hurricane Michael.
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Why is this such a problem?
Post-disaster housing implementation is inherently a policy issue 
because policymakers, governments both local, state, and federal, 
are the ones who determine the policies that impact implementation, 
and ultimately, they are often the same play makers who fund 
these restorations. The existing procedure is for disaster recovery 
funding to start at the federal level and trickle down through state 
and local governments as well as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) before aid reaches communities. The process includes 
federal programs like FEMA, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), local decision-makers like city council 
and county task forces, and includes cooperation from funders, 
logisticians, and insurers. Non-profits may also play a role.
While many of these organizations have plans and grants in place 
specifically for post-disaster recovery, there are pitfalls to them that 
contribute to the exacerbation of the post-disaster housing crisis. A 
big problem lies in the process itself. The fact that funding trickles all 
the way down from the federal level before it reaches communities 
separates the funding too far from the community, city, and even 
the state impacted, and greatly slows the process of aid being 
received. Additionally, the international law that applies in the event 
of a natural disaster, Principles on Housing and Property Restitution 
for Refugees and Displaced Persons (the Pinheiro Principles), 
was not originally intended for natural disasters but was extended 
from a protection law for displaced refugees (Gould 2009, 173).
In the MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics’ report titled 
“Disaster Housing Construction Challenges in America: Exploring 
the Role of Factory-Built Housing,” they focus on factory-built 
homes, their benefits, and some factors that might prevent them 
from being implemented. They bring up pitfalls in the system, most 
of which center around code and zoning discrepancies between 
the federal, state, and local levels. For clarity, code differs on the 
state and sometimes local level, while zoning is a county, city, 
or municipal affair, not regulated or uniform from state to state 
(MIT 2019, 4). Most of FEMA’s assistance, the study points out, 
centers around “manufactured homes” governed by a pre-emptive 
national building code established by the “HUD Code.” Thus, this 
assistance does not always align with local building zoning laws 
(MIT 2019, 5). Another disheartening fact is highlighted in this report,
Figure 2. Damage caused by Hurricane Michael.
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“Contrary to the usual role of state, local, tribal, and territorial 
governments leading disaster response and recovery, 
in housing matters, states view the federal government 
as the leader. States pay none of the costs related to 
disaster housing rental and repair programs” (MIT 2019, 7). 
Thus, state and local governments are unable to assist their 
communities following devastating disasters and must wait 
on federal assistance, which can take a significant amount 
of time for approval and implementation. Discrepancies like 
these suggest that policy change or manipulation is crucial 
to soothing or eliminating post-disaster housing crises.
Recovery statistics after Hurricane Michael are just one example of 
what happens far too often following devastating natural disasters 
across the country. FEMA assistance is often hardest to attain for 
those who need it the most, people with low incomes and home 
renters. Following Hurricane Michael, FEMA denial rates in some 
areas were as high as 50% (Disaster Housing Recovery Coalition, 
2019). Following previous disasters, administrations activated the 
Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP) to aid specifically 
the lowest-income disaster victims (Disaster Housing Recovery 
Coalition, 2019). Following Hurricane Michael, FEMA denied 
activation of the program. They instead enacted their Transition 
Shelter Assistance (TSA) motel voucher program, not accessible 
to many low-income victims due to their financial status (Disaster 
Housing Recovery Coalition 2019). As a result, many low-income 
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residents were rendered homeless, many still living in cars and tents 
a year after the storm. A total of 5,000 of Bay County’s 174,000 
residents were still homeless a year after the storm (Schneider 
2019). Residents and local officials are still struggling with receiving 
the help they need. As recently as July 2020, leaders of Bay County, 
Mexico Beach, Panama City, Springfield, Parker, Lynn Haven, The 
Panama City Housing Authority, and local non-profits cosigned 
a letter outlining FEMA’s disparaging storm response, citing 
“inconsistent guidance, inaccurate and inconsistent application 
of FEMA policy and communication issues” (Calhoun 2021). 
Problems with post-disaster housing lie not only in the policy that 
exists, but in the implementation, or lack of implementation, of it.
What can be done to fix the problem?
It is important for families to be placed back into homes quickly 
because this helps them, local governments, and local economies. 
When there is nowhere to live, local governments struggle to find 
places for aid workers to be housed during the recovery process, 
which slows down this already creeping process. With fewer aid 
workers comes fewer houses and buildings mitigated and rebuilt, 
which means the city’s economic recovery is slowed or halted. An 
effort whose main goal is to put families back into their homes quickly 
(within twelve to twenty weeks of disaster) is [bc] Workshop’s RAPIDO 
Housing. Starting with Hurricane Dolly in 2008, the company has 
designed a system in which they implement homes built using 
previously constructed systems, informed by resident input, and built 
using local labor, allowing for communities to return to life on their 
own property, swiftly and comfortably. This, in turn, helps speed 
up the process of recovering local economies and communities.
With the RAPIDO model for post-disaster housing, [bc] Workshop 
produces a package of materials off-site that become “the core:” a 
400 square foot pod that can be constructed by local volunteers in 
the community in about a week ([bc] Workshop 2020). These pods 
resemble those handed out by FEMA, but the important difference 
is that FEMA’s assistance is only allowable for temporary housing, 
while [bc] Workshop’s “core” is a permanent structure that can be built 
upon and made unique in the months following a resident’s move-in 
(2020). This proves to be a more beneficial solution than FEMA’s 
manufactured homes, and their end price is about the same (Tyx 2018).
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The RAPIDO pilot program produced 20 prototype units for three 
counties in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas  in 2015. Using their 
ground-up approach of connecting with communities and residents 
in need from the beginning and dedicating themselves to community 
involvement throughout the process, [bc] Workshop’s project proved 
successful in these communities. [bc] Workshop emphasizes the 
importance of the involvement of community members in the 
rebuilding of their own communities, both through community 
engagement meetings and utilization of local skilled workers in 
construction itself. In turn, all this community involvement results in 
comfortable, place-based housing that residents feel they had a part 
in creating for themselves and their neighbors, making them active 
participators in the rebuilding of the communities that they love.
Figure 3. [bc] Workshop’s RAPIDO model.
Figure 4. [bc] Workshop’s “core.”
[bc] Workshop has also taken necessary steps to set up future 
endeavors for disaster relief housing for success. They have 
created documents that present suggestions for necessary 
policy changes that would help with the implementation of 
disaster relief housing, a step-by-step guide to implementing their 
Disaster Recovery Housing Program in other communities, as 
well as a Program Comparison Report that draws conclusions 
from several disasters in the United States and their response, 
providing the framework for their policy change suggestions.
Post-disaster housing is a design issue, but more than that, it is 
a policy issue. It is of substantial importance for the wellbeing of 
individuals and communities, especially during the regrowth period 
following a natural disaster, that federal, state, and local governments 
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understand this problem as a policy issue and do something to fix it. 
Many of the policy change suggestions outlined by [bc] Workshop 
focus on preparedness before disaster, including but not limited 
to environmental reviews, land use planning, and including local 
stakeholders in the process of “pre-covery.” ([bc] Workshop 2015). 
They emphasize the necessity of clear administrative structures that 
set residents up for success in navigating the recovery process post-
disaster ([bc] Workshop 2015). These are just a few of the things 
that [bc] Workshop cites as necessary actions for policy makers 
to assist in the bettering of the disaster relief housing problem.
Without setting up communities for success with pre-disaster 
planning, it is hard for solutions like RAPIDO to be successful.
With viable suggestions and effective 
solutions, why is there still a problem? 
It is frustrating to see that, while a large breadth of research has 
been completed and effective solutions have been designed and 
implemented, disaster relief housing is still a problem, especially 
in communities like those affected by Hurricane Michael, who 
are still feeling the sting more than three years later. Hurricane 
Katrina, one of the most devastating natural disasters on record, 
was a catalyst for necessary policy change. It even got its name 
put into a new authority, the “Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act” (PKEMRA), which altered the operations of FEMA, 
filling gaps that were brought to light by Hurricane Katrina (FEMA 
2021). FEMA is still making changes regularly, with amendments
Figure 5. [bc] Workshop’s “core” with customized additions being constructed.
Figure 6. A family stands in front of their completed RAPIDO home.
to the Stafford Act coming just this year (2021). But, as is evidenced 
every time a hurricane occurs, even as recently as Hurricane Ida 
in September of 2021, these changes are not enough to solve 
the post-disaster housing crisis. Effective solutions like RAPIDO 
housing are not getting implemented at a significant capacity. In 
the Lower Rio Grande Valley, [bc] Workshop cites the separation 
between FEMA funding and HUD funding and the Stafford Act as 
roadblocks on the way to implementation ([bc] Workshop 2021). 
[bc] Workshop has experienced firsthand the policy problems that 
make solving post-disaster housing problems that much harder. 
Changes must continue to be made at the federal level, and thus 
filter to the state and local levels, in order for solutions like RAPIDO 
to be implemented at a substantial rate to have a greater impact.
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Why is this problem persisting? 
What can we do to fix it? 
The root of the issue is that the post-disaster 
housing crisis can be categorized as a wicked 
problem. Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, two Berkley 
professors, published an article in 1973 discussing “wicked” 
problems, specifically “wicked” social problems. Their article was 
titled “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning” and gave ten criteria 
that help identify problems as “wicked.” These ten criteria follow.
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem (162).
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule (162).
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but good or 
bad (162).
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a 
wicked problem (163).
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot” operation; 
because there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, every 
attempt counts significantly (163).
6. Wicked problems do not have an exhaustively describable 
set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of 
permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan 
(164).
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique (164).
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of 
another problem (165).
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem 
can be explained in numerous ways (166).
10. The planner has no right to be wrong (166).
and after the storm, what allowed them to feel “normal” again, etc. 
Interestingly, similar accounts of the impact of Hurricane Michael 
were communicated across the board. Some of these include 
people “riding out” the storm with minimal or no preparation because 
they did not expect it to be as serious as it was, anxiousness 
about the lack of communication due to downed cell towers, 
communities looking “unrecognizable” and “like war zones,” 
fearing the unknown during the storm itself, coming together 
as communities to help, check on, and take care of one another, 
and more. All the commonalities among responses have been 
categorized into five general stages that represent the progression 
of residents’ experiences before, during, and after Hurricane 
Michael. These five stages are: preparation (or lack thereof), fear, 
shock, recovery, and new normal. Commonalities found among 
interviews were interpreted into a series of posters that will highlight 
these observations taken from the stories of impacted individuals.
The graphic novel was chosen as the representational method 
for the posters after researching a number of viable storytelling 
options. Graphic novels present an accessible way of reading, 
recognizable like a comic book with simple text. They also 
provide an accessible way to present emotion through imagery 
that allow readers to relate to what they are reading. For 
example, “Hurricanes, Hot Meals, and Helicopters,” a graphic 
novel series by World Health Kitchen, graphically represents 
several different people, their experiences, and emotions. They 
represent statistics and the people they affected simultaneously.
These criteria prove that the post-disaster housing crisis is a 
wicked problem. Wicked problems are challenging, but this only 
makes their study more important. Wicked problems cannot be 
solved quickly. They can take generations of research by many 
to achieve any kind of success or solutions. Upon recognizing the 
depth and wicked nature of the post-disaster housing problem, I 
decided to focus on taking a first step in the long process of seeking 
a solution to this problem. The following study was chosen as this 
necessary first step. The goal of the study is to raise awareness 
of the post-disaster housing problem by presenting the case study 
of Hurricane Michael through personal accounts and factual data.
After conducting interviews with a number of relatives and other 
individuals from my home county (Bay County, Florida) asking 
questions about their experiences during and after the storm, I 
discovered a series of similarities between them. I communicated 
with eight residents of different backgrounds and ages. Questions 
were formulated that allowed them to talk about their experiences 
with the storm, focusing specifically on housing, displacement from 
their home, experiences with insurance, FEMA, etc. to get a feel 
for their experience on the post-disaster housing front, given the 
focus of this study. There were also questions that allowed room 
for residents to tell their personal stories and how they felt during 
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Figure 7. Hurricanes, Hot Meals, and Helicopters by World Health Kitchen
The storytelling techniques of Chris Ware, an American cartoonist, 
were also studied. Ware often graphically represents a “day 
in the life” or singular experience of a person, their emotions, 
thought, placement in space and time, etc. in his stories. 
The way the emotion and experience of people are made 
evident in his work is successful in representing their stories.
Both of these precedents and more set the basis for the graphic 
techniques and goals of the posters created for Hurricanes 
and Housing. The posters aim to use techniques inspired by 
graphic novel precedents to present emotions and information in 
a way that is tangible and can be read from a large scale down 
to the detail of every word and statistic. The goal in shining a 
light on the observations made by residents through posters 
is to incite conversations about the devastation (to property, 
infrastructure, emotion, and health, both mental and physical) that 
hurricanes bring to communities like those impacted by Hurricane 
Michael. This exercise is just the beginning of a lifelong effort 
that seeks to solve the wicked post-disaster housing problem.
Figure 8. The Last Saturday by Chris Ware 
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Stage 1: Preparation 
Residents say that they “rode out” the storm with minimal or 
no preparation because they didn’t expect it to be as serious 
as it was. The minimal preparations some made did not prove 
to be helpful because of the level of destruction. Though they 
were warned by local and international media, residents of a 
hurricane prone area like North Florida have lived through many 
storms, never any of this magnitude. Many say they expected 




The fear of the unknown during the storm was prevalent. Residents were 
suddenly thrown into survival mode in the blink of an eye, protecting 
their families and belongings while their safe space, their home, 
crashed around them. Cell towers went down during the storm which 
made it impossible to connect with first responders, family or friends. 
12
Stage 3: Shock
After the wind subsided and the storm passed, residents stepped 
into a new reality. Consistent descriptors of communities and 
neighborhoods are “like a war zone,” “the apocalypse,” and 
“unrecognizable.” Life long residents had a hard time getting 
around due to the sudden lack of landmarks. The fabric of the 
area was changed forever. Roads were impassible until they were 
cleared of debris, and many roads themselves were damaged. 
Neighborhoods once known for trees were suddenly without any. 
Stage 4: Recovery
The never ending process of joining together and rebuilding 
communities began, but not before days and weeks of surviving with 
limited water, food, and electricity. Churches are consistently cited as 
organizations that came together to help following the storm, as well as 
neighbors and out-of-town volunteers. Churches provided ice, water, 
food, showers, and other helpful things to their communities, despite 
significant damage to the structure of their own building in many cases. 
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Stage 5: New Normal
Most residents say that they believe life will never feel the same as 
it did before the storm. It will never feel like the “old normal” again, 
there is only a “new normal.” Some cite getting back into their homes 
after repairs as what finally brought normalcy. The most inspiring 
thing about hearing and learning from communities  after the storm, 
whether it be days, weeks, months, or years after, is that everyone 
seems to agree that the future will be bright. They will figure everything 
out somehow. Structures will be rebuilt and they will replace things. 
Many cite their faith as helping get them through the storm itself and 
continuing to help them persevere through the recovery process. 
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What can we do?
All initiatives have one thing in common that they need to make 
things happen: people. It is up to us to get involved in the process of 
bettering the post-disaster recovery process for our neighborhoods 
and fellow citizens. If you want to help, use your resources to 
connect the right people. Invest in or volunteer at a non-profit that 
is focused on post-disaster recovery. Write letters to your local, 
state, and federal government leaders. Start the conversation. 
Educate people around you about the issues. When you hear about 
a hurricane on the news, remember the lives that it is impacting. 
That could be you. Make an effort to make a difference in their lives.
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The value of this exploration is that it starts to give a voice to those 
who feel that they have not been heard for the past three years. 
These voices need to be heard, not only to simply tell the story of 
a devastating hurricane and its impact, but these details need to 
be heard by the right people, those that can help solve problems. 
As is suggested by [bc] Workshop, community engagement and 
involvement in the process of their own rehabilitation is crucial to 
the success of disaster relief housing solutions. Changes need to 
occur not only at the federal level but at the state and local levels 
to improve the process of disaster relief housing implementation 
and therefore help solve the post-disaster housing crisis. Local 
governments can do things like creating pre-disaster plans, defining 
hazardous areas in their jurisdictions, and controlling zoning and 
code in these areas to prevent devastating damage to infrastructure 
in the event of a disaster. Local governments, most importantly, 
should prepare for disasters and seek as much control as they can 
over the recovery process. Recovery works best when it is grounded 
heavily at the local level. State and federal governments have more 
power, and with this comes more responsibility to make changes 
that make a difference. State governments should implement 
and operate post-disaster task forces whose only job is to ensure 
that communities impacted get the help they need in a timely and 
effective manner. Federal governments should aid both the state and 
local levels in their post-disaster assistance. Federal governments 
should spend more time and money on research and land 
mapping that targets the areas that are most at risk for hurricanes 
so that they can be better prepared for them when they come. 
Federal organizations like FEMA should adjust their processes to 
accommodate people with lower incomes and home-renters instead 
of favoring homeowners. Federal funding should be spent at the 
local level on organization, workers, materials, etc., which not only 
makes funding cheaper but puts money back in the pockets of 
affected communities. Recovery and construction of replacement 
housing should be simplified so that it can occur at the state and local 
levels, thus speeding up the recovery process and making it more 
personal to communities. State and local governments that have 
plans and funding in place can respond much faster than federal 
governments, which allows for communities to stay together during 
recovery, resulting in a better post-recovery community and life.
This exploration should not only encourage empathy for the post-
disaster housing problem and those it effects but should spark 
necessary action for change so that individuals and communities 
are not affected in the devastating ways that those impacted by 
Hurricane Michael were. Communities are resilient, people band 
together, but it is up to governments to set up communities for 
success in preparation for a devastating event. Education is key, but 
taking action is the most important thing. With a changing climate, 
pre-disaster preparation will only become more important to prevent 
the post-disaster housing crisis from persisting in the years to come. 
CONCLUSION
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